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Evangelos Protopapadakis: Professor Savulescu, thank you for accepting my 
invitation; having the chance to discuss with you is a pleasure 
and an honor. As a Professor of Practical Ethics, you 
probably often have to explain why there is a 
need to distinguish between theoret-
ical and practical ethics. I some-
times think that ethics would 
either tend to be practical, 
or be pure metaphysics. 
Please tell me what you 
think.
Julian Savulescu: The-
oretical ethics includes 
both metaethics (the 
meaning of moral terms) 
and normative ethics (ethical 
theories and principles). Practi-
cal ethics involves making decisions 
about every day real ethical problems, 
like decisions about euthanasia, what we 
should eat, climate change, treatment of ani-
mals, and how we should live. It utilizes ethical theo-
ries, like utilitarianism and Kantianism, and principles, but 
more broadly a process of reflective equilibrium and consisten-
cy to decide how to act and be.
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Evangelos Protopapadakis: You have famously claimed that our species’ 
moral progress is trivial when compared with scientific and technical advanc-
es,1 and that this makes man unfit for the future. Your views have been severe-
ly criticized by ethicists who base their arguments on the dramatic improve-
ments in the human condition, the dominance of human rights, increased 
respect for autonomy, personhood and individuality, etc.2 How would you 
respond to the challenge?
Julian Savulescu: There has undoubtedly been progress. I have two responses. 
Firstly, the real progress has not been as great as proponents purport. There 
has been a veneer of progress. Inequality increases, vast tracts of the human 
population still live in poverty, people are increasingly exploited by capital-
ism, and nonhuman animals still live in appalling conditions that will be seen 
in the future as the slavery of our time. Animal rights is a great example: we 
espouse equality and better conditions for animals, but most domesticated 
animals under our control still live in grotesque factory farms. It is moral 
hypocrisy. The beacon of moral progress and advance, the US, is bursting at 
the seams with obesity, racism, inequality, exploitation, while waging expen-
sive, illegal and immoral wars around the globe that compromise progress, 
security and fester terrorism. I don’t see as much progress as the progressives.
Secondly, even if there were the grand achievements progressives purport, it 
still would not be enough. So extensive are our cognitive achievements that 
our technology is super powerful, for good and evil. Given the stakes, we 
need to be much more moral and wise in our use of it. To give just one exam-
ple, human beings have now been gene edited. He Jiankui has edited at least 
three babies. But the arguments given by him, and even by some respected 
leaders of the science,3 are superficial and at times child-like. I am a supporter 
of human enhancement, but it needs to be stepwise, informed by sound eth-
ics. As I argued, the first in human trials should have been on catastrophic, 
lethal genetic conditions. Such humans have little to lose when the technolo-
gy is still raw and could have serious side effects. Even this basic point about 
1 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1ff.
2 See, for example, John Harris, “Moral Enhancement and Freedom,” Bioethics 25, no. 2 (2011): 
102-111; also Robert Sparrow, “Better Living Through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and 
Persson on ‘Moral Enhancement,’” Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2014): 23-32, and 
J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon, “On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to 
Savulescu and Persson,” Bioethics 28, no. 1 (2014): 153-161.
3 Julian Savulescu and Peter Singer, “An Ethical Pathway for Gene Editing,” Bioethics 33, no. 
2 (2019): 221-222; Julian Savulescu, “The Fundamental Ethical Flaw in Jiankui He’s Alleged 
Gene Editing Experiment,” Practical Ethics: Ethics in the News, published November 28, 2018, 
http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2018/11/the-fundamental-ethical-flaw-in-jiankui-hes-al-
leged-gene-editing-experiment/.
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reasonable risk has not been grasped. We need better secular ethics education 
to be sure. But we also need to be prepared to act more ethically and that is 
a limited human capacity, like any of our capacities.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: You have advocated extreme measures in the 
pursuit of moral enhancement, including external control by a so-called “god 
machine.”4 Wouldn’t such a development totally annihilate free will and au-
tonomy, making thus morality totally redundant or obsolete?
Julian Savulescu: I didn’t advocate the “god machine.” It was a thought ex-
periment that will unlikely ever become a reality. It was designed to help 
us think about the value and place of freedom amongst other values, like 
well-being and security. It is meant to show that freedom is just one value 
and some sacrifice of freedom can be justified for well-being. In the example, 
people lose one freedom; the freedom to desire to kill innocent people. That 
is a freedom that might, under certain circumstances, be worth giving up. The 
point is that freedom and autonomy are not trump values, or absolute values. 
They are very, very important. But it is manifestly true that they are just val-
ues that must be balanced against others. That is why we have laws against 
speeding and murder.
But I also argued that many moral bioenhancements of the kind we were con-
sidering (like increasing empathy or altruism) would not undermine freedom. 
Many would enhance autonomy. For example, I argued that Ritalin improves 
impulse control. It reduces spontaneous aggression in people with ADHD. 
But it also increases autonomy and well-being by allowing people to defer 
gratification and go for larger long term rewards. It is a moral bioenhancer, 
which is also a cognitive enhancer, which improves well-being and increases 
autonomy.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: Many philosophers consider certain situations in 
life, ones we tend to think of as untoward or unwanted – like injustice, suffer-
ing, struggle, envy etc. – either as opportunities for moving forward, or even 
as a blessing for the sufferer. Famously Nietzsche argues that the discipline of 
great suffering has produced all the elevations of human nature.5 Would the 
kind of life you envision, one (in part or fully) devoid of man-inflicted evil, be 
an equally rich life for humans? Does this perception take into consideration 
the right to an open future?
Julian Savulescu: It is my view, not this view which takes into account the 
right to an open future. I think it should be up to people to decide how much 
4 Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, “Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine,” 
Monist 95, no. 3 (2012): 399-421.
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, ed. Rolf-Pe-
ter Horstmann, and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), § 225.
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suffering they experience. If you choose to go on a grueling marathon full of 
pain and suffering, hats off to you. That is entirely different to being put on a 
treadmill and forced to run, or finding yourself on a treadmill causing enor-
mous pain and suffering and not being able to get off if you want to.
Life will for the foreseeable future inevitably have suffering. We will die, have 
accidents and get some diseases. Eventually, our technology and bodies will 
have limits and they will pack it in. Suffering is unavoidable. Giving people 
some control over the kinds and extent of suffering is a good thing.
As I have argued in a paper with Hannah Maslenand Carin Hunt6 on motiva-
tional enhancement, what really matters is not suffering, but commitment to 
worthwhile values. Suffering is a good proxy for commitment, as is the cost 
to a person (as Wittgenstein recognized), but we argue that what really mat-
ters is commitment to objectively worthwhile goals. Suffering can help you 
realize that, and it can be required to attain what is worthwhile, but in itself it 
is a bad thing. There is no extra value in playing top ping pong with one hand 
tied behind your back.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: You have argued in favor of procreative be-
neficence,7 a principle you consider superior to competing ones, especially 
procreative autonomy. You discuss PB as a moral choice one is expected or 
justified to opt for, since doing so obviously is to the benefit of everybody. 
Could PB also stand for a perfect duty in the Kantian sense, a morally – and 
legally – binding one? Or this would be a form of moral coercion?
Julian Savulescu: I have argued that procreative beneficence (the moral obli-
gation to select the child with the best prospect of the best life) is a superior 
moral principle to procreative autonomy. That is, people ought to select the 
embryo that will be happier and have an objectively better life rather than one 
which they happen to desire more, say because the embryo will have blond 
hair and blue eyes. But I also argued that in law, people ought to be free to 
select the embryos they wish, even if they are acting to choose less than the 
best. I have also argued that when the public interest is sufficiently at stake, 
freedom could be curtailed. Coercion in reproduction could be justified when 
the public interest consideration is sufficient. Say for example many people 
wished to select a trait which had significant costs to society: these could 
be through the social costs such as health care, or through those individuals 
6 Hannah Maslen, Carin Hunt, and Julian Savulescu, ‘“No Pain, No Praise?’: Praiseworthiness 
and Motivational Enhancement,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (forthcoming).
7 Julian Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children,” Bio-
ethics 15, nos. 5-6 (2001): 413-426; also Julian Savulescu, “In Defence of Procreative Benef-
icence,” Journal of Medical Ethics 33, no. 5 (2007): 284-288, and Julian Savulescu and Guy 
Kahane, “Understanding Procreative Beneficence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive 
Ethics, ed. Leslie Francis, 592-621 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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causing direct harm to others. It might be legitimate to restrict freedom to 
some degree to protect society. This is what the Church did in Cyprus to deal 
with the massive public health problem of Thalassemia. It required couples to 
have carrier testing before getting married. It did not require prenatal test-
ing, or termination of pregnancy, but this was enough to cause a massive 
reduction in the incidence of Thalassemia, which was bankrupting their health 
system. It was coercion, but justified.
Could coercion be justified for the sake of the well-being of the child select-
ed? Sure. If parents wanted to select an embryo with a life which was not 
worth living (say a life with unrelievable pain and suffering), then this would 
be grounds for coercive intervention.
I don’t think in terms of Kantian perfect duties. There are values: autonomy, 
well-being, public interest; these give rise to reasons which can conflict. The 
reasons need to weighed, like vectors in physics, to see what we have most 
reason to do.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: Autonomy-related concerns are all-pervasive in 
Bioethics and Medical Ethics. Do you believe that autonomy in general is a 
bit overestimated? Should it be a lesser concern whenever it conflicts with 
beneficence, at least as Bioethics and Medical Ethics are concerned?
Julian Savulescu: No, I think autonomy is more important than well-being 
generally. But I have a very high bar for what constitutes an autonomous de-
cision; it should be rational (fully informed, logical and based on vivid imag-
ination of all relevant alternatives) and based on reasons. People can and 
should die for causes, giving up all prospect of well-being. But it is important 
that those choices are fully autonomous, in a Kantian or Millian sense.8
Evangelos Protopapadakis: Perfectly healthy offspring is most of the times 
and to most parents preferable to handicapped or impaired ones. However, is 
it a good (or, better) thing to have a healthy child, while it is a bad (or, worse) 
thing to have one with not so good prospects in life?
Julian Savulescu: The reason that medicine is developed to prevent or treat 
impairments is that it is better not to have those things. The reason folate 
is put in cereals is prevent spina bifida in pregnancy because it is bad to be 
paralyzed and have cognitive impairment. If a child develops a condition that 
without treatment will leave her blind, deaf, paralyzed or intellectually dis-
abled, we should treat that condition because those states are worse, just as 
my asthma is worse for me.
8 Julian Savulescu, “Autonomy, the Good Life, and Controversial Choices,” in The Blackwell 
Guide to Medical Ethics, ed. R. Rhodes, L.P. Francis, and A. Silvers, 17-37 (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007).
[ 130 ]
EVANGELOS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS ETHICAL MINEFIELDS AND THE VOICE OF COMMON SENSE
Of course, when it comes to persons, rather than states of a person, like 
asthma or paralysis, everyone should have the best chance of the best life, 
or be treated equally, or given equal respect. People who are deaf (or have 
asthma, like me) should have equality of opportunity to participate in society 
and have their best chance to the best life for them. Saying a condition is bad 
is not the same as saying a person is bad, or has less moral value. We are not 
identical with the states of our bodies. We are persons with minds.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: Discussing moral decisions on a better-and-
worse basis seems to presuppose selecting angles and views; nevertheless, 
doing so sometimes (or, always to some) is a bit arbitrary, and this is the 
most common criticism against utilitarianism: in whose point of view is the 
outcome of any moral choice preferable to the one of any other? Is there an 
answer to the riddle? 
Julian Savulescu: Questions about value are difficult and unresolved. But I 
think the move to ethical relativism is not justified. Even if we can’t cardinally 
rank all states from 1-100 does not mean that some states are not better 
than others. We have to give arguments, and I have introduced the welfarist 
concept of disability to try to argue for a new way of thinking about disabil-
ities and their value or disvalue.9
If one subscribes to ethical relativism, there is nothing to be said about the 
Nazi’s values: they just had different values to us. Ethical relativism is, for 
practical purposes, equivalent to ethical nihilism.
The great challenge today is to agree on what values we stand for, both as in-
dividuals and societies. Freedom, well-being, justice are all defensible values. 
Some conceptions of these will be justifiable, others not. We need reflective 
equilibrium to narrow down the candidates.
It is important not to confuse ethical relativism with supervenience, or the 
context dependency of moral judgements. I gave the example of Cyprus 
appropriately restricting reproductive freedom because Thalassemia was so 
common. That condition does not obtain in the UK and so that restriction 
of freedom is not appropriate. Moral judgements should be sensitive to the 
facts, but that does not mean there are not universal moral reasons. Reasons 
are like vectors in physics. They have a direction and strength. The strength 
varies according to facts, but they continue to point in the same direction. 
These vectors should be weighed.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: Talking about criticism against utilitarianism 
– and consequentialism in general – many thinkers, mostly those into the 
9 Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu, “The Welfarist Account of Disability,” in Disability and Dis-
advantage, ed.  A. Cureton, and K. Brownlee, 14-53 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Kantian tradition in ethics, argue that utilitarianism is based on some instru-
mental conception of reason. Arendt, for example, claims that utilitarians 
fail to distinguish between “in order to” and “for the sake of.”10 Should we, 
eventually, face moral dilemmas on the basis of worth or value?
Julian Savulescu: I don’t really understand that distinction. Utilitarians do 
base their judgements on worth or value: either people’s happiness, or pref-
erences (autonomy), or some objective conception of their well-being. And 
it treats every person equally by considering their well-being equal to anyone 
else’s. One unit of your happiness is equal to one unit of mine. Your happi-
ness does not matter more just because it is yours. Utilitarianism is radically 
impartial and egalitarian. I am not utilitarian – I don’t believe I ought to give 
one of my kidney’s to someone who needs one. But it is a theory based on 
reasons and value and a very credible moral theory. I think very often people 
give silly and superficial objections to it. It is essential prudence at an impar-
tial global level.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: Being able to tell right from wrong, virtue from 
vice, utility from harm, doesn’t seem to be a sufficient reason for selecting 
one over the other; most people, exactly like Euripides’ Medea, seem eager 
to surrender to what they know to be evil. If the human nature is just like this, 
how effective may moral education be?
Julian Savulescu: That is why I believe we should consider, explore, research 
moral bioenhancement to increase moral motivation. Unless one is an inter-
nalist who believes knowing what is right involves being motivated to pursue 
it, we need to buttress moral motivation. I am externalist about moral reason.
Evangelos Protopapadakis: You have advocated organ-donation euthanasia 
with the purpose of making more organs available for transplant.11 I am a 
strong advocate of organ- and body-donation myself; in my view all major 
traditions in ethics would either justify or even prescribe organ donation, 
especially when it comes to donation-after-circulatory-death donors, even 
if the diseased has left no advance directives. What do you think about this? 
Would implementing wide-range presumed consent organ donation regula-
tions be a morally justifiable answer?
Julian Savulescu: Yes. One uncontroversial moral duty is a duty of easy 
rescue. If you can bring about great good (or prevent great harm) at little 
cost to yourself by some action, you should perform that action. Organ 
donation after death (or unconsciousness, or during dying) is a zero cost 
10 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 154.
11 Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu, “Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia? 
Alternatives for Maximizing the Number and Quality of Organs for Transplantation,” Bioethics 
26, no. 1 (2012): 32-48.
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rescue. If morality requires anything, it requires that. We should: 1. adopt 
presumed consent, 2. deprioritize those who opt out, 3. remove family ve-
toes, 4. embrace donation after circulatory death (DCD) and organ dona-
tion euthanasia, and 5. allow organ retrieval from people who are perma-
nently unconscious.
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